Posts Tagged ‘Phoenix Command’

The Balkans have had their borders changed so many times over the centuries that many of the present and emerging borders will continue to divide ethnic groups even as migration and warfare scatter many other ethnic groups throughout the region. The Balkans are spiderwebs of conflicting ethnic groups and historic claims.

Untangling these to the satisfaction of all is a pleasant fantasy that will never be reality. The best that can be expected is a shaky peace that will ultimately be made permanent when the ethnic ties and claims are forgotten. This section briefly explores some of the oustanding territorial claims and counterclaims of the Balkan nations and their neighbors. Although few of these claims are actual government policies, all represent the aspirations of nationalists within the region. Given the strengths of nationalist movements in the Balkans, these claims will be potential sources for future conflicts in the region.

Albania: Albania has shakily started on the road to reform after a half-century of Communist rule. In 1990, violent political demonstrations in Tirane permitted President Ramiz Alia to remove several hardline communists from power and start on democratic reforms. This was not enough to prevent 57,000 Albanian “boat people” from leaving the country for Italy from 1990 to August 1991. Italy has since stepped up aid to Albania, but this was insufficient to permit the Albanian government to prevent tragic food riots in December 1991. The Albanian relationship with Yugoslavia/Serbia is difficult as the latter is Albania’s major trading partner and Albania does not want to criticize Yugoslavia too harshly. However, Albanians are greatly angered by the rough treatment of ethnic Albanians living in Kosovo and Macedonia by the Serbian-dominated Yugoslav government. Albanian minorities in Macedonia/Illiridia and Kosovo have long been agitiating for union with “Greater Albania” and have received political support from Albania.

Austria: Austria is presently suffering from a slow resurgence of neo-Nazi sentiment spearheaded by the Freedom Party (FPO), which made gains in the November 1991 regional elections on a platform of anti-immigration. The Austrians have also been flooded with Croatian refugees fleeing the fighting in their home state. Austrian territorial ambitions go back to the Hapsburghs and encompass all of Slovenia and parts of Italy surrounding Trieste, although none of these ambitions are likely to be fulfilled in the forseeable future.

Bulgaria: Bulgaria has historical claims to the whole of Macedonia, although at present Bulgarians are not pressing such claims, preferring instead to keep the Balkans stable. Bulgaria has demanded of Macedonia that the latter surrender any claims to Bulgarian Macedonian provinces as a condition for recognition. In addition, Bulgarians would like to obtain western Thrace from Greece, but a present mutual defence pact with Greece against Turkey and potentially Macedonia would preclude this. Bulgaria also has a substantial Turkish population within its borders and this has caused ethnic strife and anti-Turk rioting between Bulgarian and Turkish populations, who have a mutual disgust for each other. The Bulgarian Communist government pursued its own anti-Turkish pogrom from 1984 to 1989, causing 300,000 Bulgarian Turks to flee to Turkey.

Croatia: Croatian nationalists have already made moves to exercise their claims to Bosnia, and if possible, they would like to have all of the former Yugoslav coast from Montenegro to Trieste.

Greece: Greece has had a running feud with Turkey for more than a century, a feud which goes back to Ottoman domination of the Balkans, and the Greco-Turk war of 1919-1922. Greece, quite simply, covets Thrace out to Constantinople, Ionia to the Dardanelles, and ”enosis” with Crete. From the Balkans, Greece would like parts of southern Albania known as Nothern Epirus and several Aegean islands. Also, Greece has been quite vocal in preventing European Community recognition of Macedonia until the latter changes its name to the Vardar Republic, presumably to forestall any Macedonian claims on Greek Salonikan territory, but also to legitimize its own claims to the whole of Macedonia.

Hungary: The Hungarian people have scattered throughout much of the Balkans and have not been treated well in the lands in which they now live. Although the government of Hungary is not interested in irredentism, Hungarian minorities in foreign lands could rise to assert their ethnicity and demand assistance from Budapest. The Hungarians in Transylvania were oppressed by Romanian “de-Maygarisation” programs, possibly as revenge for the “Maygarization of the Vlachs” practiced when Hungary ruled Transylvania. Currently, the Hungarian Transylvanians, who helped to start the 1989 revolution against Ceausescu are petitioning for their own cultural identity, a sore point between Hungary and Romania. Other Hungarians exist in concentrations in Vojvodina in northern Serbia, and the future of these people under Serbian rule has yet to be determined.

Iran and the Middle East: The tribulations of a Muslim majority in Bosnia-Hercegovina prompted Iranian spiritual leader Ali Khameni to call on all Islamic nations to assist Bosnia-Hercegovina to become an Islamic state in Europe. In August 1992, the United Nations was under pressure from several Islamic nations to provide military assistance to Bosnia-Hercegovina. The Islamic nations of the Middle East have little political interest in a distant European region fighting for independence, but the religious ties have already been tenuously used as a political hammer to increase the international influence of these nations.

Israel: Israel may offer humanitarian aid to Jews within former Yugoslavia as they did for former Soviet and Ethiopian Jews, but otherwise, Israel has no interest in the region.

Italy: Italy has no territorial claims on the Balkans, other than the Dalmatian coast of Croatia. Italy at present is content to accept its role as Balkan economic and spiritual savior, a role it filled by accepting many Albanian refugees during the summer exodus of 1991. Acting as savior would also give Italy economic dominance over the region.

Macedonia/Vardar Republic: One of the dreams of former Yugoslav leader Josef “Tito” Broz was to create a “Greater Macedonia” incorporating the traditional regions of Macedonia which were under the dominion of Bulgaria and Greece. Much of the current tension between Bulgaria, Greece, and Macedonia over Macedonia’s name is based in Bulgarian and Greek fears that Macedonia may try to press its claims to “Greater Macedonia.” The independence of Macedonia in January 1992 angered Greece, which believed that the very name of Macedonia indicated a desire to press territorial claims to Salonika (Greek Macedonia). Even Bulgaria, which recognized Macedonian independence early on had concerns about territorial claims on its Macedonian provinces. These two nations have been quite vocal in preventing Macedonia from achieving international recognition, demanding that Macedonia change its name to the Vardar republic. Also, Albanikos within Macedonia had been agitating for independence and in April declared the independent republic of Iliridia in northwest Macedonia.

Romania: Romania is still pulling itself out of the tomb dug by Ceausescu and is dealing with rumors of a “false revolution” which installed anti-Ceausescu communists in power as the National Salvation Front. Presently, Romanian territorial claims encompass the former Soviet republic of Moldova, which used to be Romanian Bessarabia.

Russia and the Ukraine: The new Commonwealth of Independent States remains troubled by internal disputes and an economic nightmare left behind by the previous communist governments and its focus is on rebuilding its political and economic integri­ty. Its present concern with the Balkans centres on Romania and Moldova. Moldova, as stated above, used to be Romanian Bessarabia, but was ceded to the Soviet Union in 1940. Moldova is heavily populated with Vlach descendants who have been agitating for unification with Romania. This has upset the Russians and Ukranians living in the region, who have formed the self-proclaimed Dnestr Republic. Several skirmishes occurred between Moldovans and Dnestrians in early 1992, and peace negotiations between Russian, Ukranian, Moldovan, and Romanian diplomats have been unable to reach a peaceful resolution. More on the battles in the Dnestr republic can be found in the Red Embers Scenario Pack, which covers conflicts in the Commonwealth of Independent States and former Soviet republics. Another possible area of concern is the Black Sea Fleet and other disputes between Russia and the Ukraine. If the Russian and Ukranian governments can finally settle the debate over title to the Black Sea Fleet, then there may be impacts on the other Black Sea nations like Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey. Also, the Ukranians may turn towards the Balkans to assist their “Fellow Slavs” should such assistance be required. In fact, Ukranians have been part of the UN peacekeepers stationed in Sarajevo since August 1992.

Serbia: In the quest for Serboslavia, or Greater Serbia, Serbian nationalists have claimed Vojvodina, Kosovo, much of Croatia, all of Bosnia-Hercegovina, and bits and pieces from their Balkan neighbors, such as the Baranya region of Hungary, the Serb-dominated regions of Romania, and Independent, Bulgarian, and Greek Macedonia. At present, Serbs have their hands full trying to keep the Federated Republic of Yugoslavia together.

Slovenia: Slovenian nationalists would like to claim Trieste, as heirs of an outstanding Yugoslav claim to the area. Also, Slovenians have historical claims to the Carinthian region of Austria.

Turkey: Historically a major ruler of the Balkans, Turkey presently has its own problems with Kurdish insurgency, border and water rights arguments with Syria and Iraq, aggravating squabbles with petulant Greece, concerns about Turkish minorities in Bulgaria, rising power of Islamic fundamentalists, and Armenian ASALA terrorists. It is quite a list of problems. Only the problems with Greece, Bulgaria, and Armenia could directly impact the Balkans, although these nations might become adventurous if Turkey’s attention were diverted to fighting Kurds, Syrians, or Iraqis. Greek and Bulgarian claims against Turkey have already been examined. Armenian claims go back to Ottoman military operations in Armenia from 1915 to 1923, where Armenians claimed Ottoman forces engaged in genocide, killing between 600,000 and 1 million Armenians. The Turks claim the deaths were incidental to the fighting, citing their own casualties of 2 million Turks, and the deaths were not part of a genocide program. The Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) and other terrorist groups have been assassinating Turkish politicians since 1975 over the Armenian genocide.


One of the largest upheavals in the Balkan region was the violent overthrow of Romania’s autocratic Ceausescu regime by the democratic National Salvation Front. It marked the brutal end of the Ceausescu regime’s efforts to halt the wave of reforms breaking across Eastern Europe and the end of Romania’s nightmare of paranoia and oppression.

Nicolae Ceausescu, since he assumed ”de facto” power in 1965, treated Romania and its citizens as resources to be used in the furtherance of his dynasty. He placed thirty of his relatives in positions of power within Romania and built a personal fortune estimated in the millions of dollars. Along with Elena, his wife, he instituted several repressive policies which dehumanized the Romanian citizenry. Ceausescu’s pet projects included the repayment of a $10.2 billion foreign debt by maximizing exports to the point of creating substantial domestic shortages of food, energy, basic necessities as well as a bizarre Systemization program, which involved forcibly relocating rural residents into apartment blocks. Elena herself instituted several repressive programs to increase Romania’s birthrate, the result of which was a large number of children surrendered for adoption and an alarmingly high incidence of HIV/AIDS among children who received infected blood at birth. In order to retain power, the Ceausescus relied on the fanatical loyalty of their Securitate internal police to suppress dissent, leading to rumors of government massacres in the thousands.

It was, however, the Securitate’s repression which triggered the revolution. On December 15, 1989, Protestant pastor Laszlo Tokes who had criticized the Ceausescu regime for mistreatment of his fellow ethnic Hungarians was ordered deported. The following day, a crowd gathered near Tokes’ home in Timisoara to prevent the implementation of the deportation order. The Securitate Special Assignment Brigade allowed the protests to continue for a day before moving in with tanks and helicopter gunships and opening fire on the crowds. Several hundred casualties were reported in this first clash. Within days, demonstrations had spread to other towns and cities.

When Nicolae Ceausescu returned from a state visit to Iran on December 20, his immediate response was to declare a state of emergency in Timisoara. The following day, he attempted to give a speech to a government-sponsored rally in Bucharest promising wage increases but was shocked when the segments of the crowd turned on him and staged counter demonstrations. The Securitate were active later in the day, firing on demonstrators and using armored vehicles to disperse them. Similar armed clashes occurred in Arad, Brasov, Cluj, Sibiu, and Timisoara.

On December 22, it all fell apart. Ceausescu declared a national state of emergency and ordered the army to use force to disperse the demonstrators. Defence minister Colonel-General Vasile Milea refused, and was killed by one of Ceausescu’s bodyguards. After a last attempt to address the hostile crowd outside the Communist Party Central Committee building, Ceausescu and his wife fled the building by helicopter, leaving it to the demonstrators.

The revolutionaries at this time had organized themselves into the National Salvation Front and had received the backing of the Army. The Securitate, however, remained loyal to Ceausescu and counterattacked in a campaign of terrorism intended to frighten the Romanian people into submission. Heavy fighting took place in Bucharest, Sibiu, and Timisoara around hospitals, media buildings, and key government facilities.

By December 25 the revolution was all over. The Securitate threat had been largely neutralized by Army and National Salvation Front militia, although small pockets of resistance remained. The NSF was in control of the country. Finally, Nicolae and Elena Ceausescu, who had been captured late on December 22, were tried secretly on Christmas morning and then executed before a firing squad.

The war of Yugoslavian dissolution was fought in three consti­tuent republics during 1991 and 1992. An overview of the fighting in each region is given in this section.

Much of the trouble started brewing in 1990. Like other Communist nations in Eastern Europe, Yugoslavia underwent significant economic turmoil and hyperinflation as it tried to rid itself of a socialist economy. Nationalist factions within the ruling League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) walked out on a January 1990 congress and so doing effectively destroyed the party. Yugoslavia’s communists reorganized themselves along republican structures, giving new prominence to the local communist organizations, but without a national party leadership, there was little to check rising nationalism in all the major Yugoslavian republics and when this nationalism combined with Yugoslavians’ growing distaste for the Communists led to non-communist governments being elected in four of the six republics at the next free elections.

In Slovenia, the reformed communist Party for Democratic Renewal was defeated by the DEMOS coalition of anti-communist political parties. In Croatia, the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) under Franjo Tjudman gained the majority in the republic’s Parliament.

Bosnia-Hercegovina’s communists were defeated by nationalist groups representing Muslims, Serbs, and Croats with the Muslim Party of Democratic Action gaining power. Macedonian nationalists also gained power in that republic’s elections.

Only in Serbia and Montenegro did the former Communists manage to hold on to power with Slobodan Milosevic’s Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) gaining the majority of seats in Serbia. These elections were indicative of how the nation would later disintegrate from the newly re-ignited nationalist and irredentist unrest.

Following the election of the Croatian Democratic Union, Serbs within Croatia’s borders staged an August 19 referendum calling for Croatian Serb autonomy. When the Croatian government declared the referendum illegal, Serbs in the Krajina region raided government armories and blocked roads and railways leading to the region. Croatian police efforts to put down the uprising met with interference from JNA and Serbian authorities. This in turn sparked HDZ extremists to arm themselves to counter the Serbian insurgency. The situation was made worse when both Croatia and Slovenia assumed command of their regional TDFs and when Slovenia staged a successful separatist referendum.

1991 started with Yugoslavia in military and constitutional crisis. A January 9 Federal Presidential order for all unauthorized forces to disarm was widely ignored. Only emergency diplomatic maneuvers averted clashes between the JNA and Croatian TDF and irregular units over the enforcement of the order. A January 10 meeting among the six republics on reorganizing the Yugoslav federation was a failure as competing visions of the nation could not be reconciled. In February, both Slovenia and Croatia emplaced secession legislation and signed a mutual defence pact against JNA intervention.

Ethnic tensions continued to rise in the region as a result of three events. In February, the Serbs in Krajina declared their secession from Croatia. Then in March, 100,000 anti-SPS protestors in Belgrade organized by the Serbian Renaissance Party’s Vuk Draskovic were met with riot police and JNA troops using tanks and APCs. The violent Belgrade clashes caused a great deal of concern over the combative nature of the Milosevic government and the potential use of the JNA to settle civil disorder. Also on March 1, armed Serbs police in Pakrac in Krajina attempted to disarm their Croatian colleagues and started a riot as thousands of ethnic Serbs in the town came out to show their support. 200

Croatian ”specijalici” riot police were sent in later in the day. The next day, the JNA were deployed in Pakrac to restore order and force the Croatian special police from the area.

Fighting within Krajina would continue and grow in intensity in May. Gun battles occurred in Plitvice National Park, bombs exploded in Knin, and the JNA occupied Kijevo. May encompassed several JNA crackdowns on Croat and Serb fighting in Krajina with armored units occupying many of the villages around Knin and paratroopers relieving the Serb-besieged Kijevo. Adding to the tensions in May were the Krajina and Croatian secessionist referendums. Krajinans voted 90% to remain part of Yugoslavia, while 92.2% of Croatians voted for secession. It was on this stage of ethnic tension that Croatia and Slovenia jointly declared their independence and so started the war of Yugoslavian dissolution.


The formal declaration of Slovenian independence came on June 25, 1991 and brought forth an immediate call for military intervention from the Federal parliament. Two days later, almost 2,000 JNA troops were mobilized to seize border crossings on the Slovenian borders of Austria, Hungary, and Italy. After twelve hours of pushing through roadblocks and heavily armed resistance, the JNA reached and seized the crossings. The Slovenian airports were closed down and the Ljubljana airport came under JNA airstrikes. June 28th saw a brief halt to JNA activities and the implementation of a fragile European Community-brokered cease­fire, which quickly fell apart and sporadic fighting continued throughout Slovenia. The Slovenian TDF proved its effectiveness in a well-organized campaign against the JNA in which it was able to stage effective blockades of JNA troops before a second ceasefire was implemented. On July 3, the JNA began returning to its Slovenian barracks allowing an uneasy peace to settle during the summer.

Slovenia had participated in EC-sponsored talks with Croatia and the Federal Government on the island of Brioni on July 7. This called for a ceasefire and a three-month moratorium on the implementation of Slovenian and Croatian independence declarations. Three months later, on October 7, Slovenia once again declared its independence and dissociated itself from Yugoslavia. This was accepted by the Yugoslav government, who agreed to withdraw JNA troops and hand over military equipment by October 25th. Slovenia had attained its sovereignty.


Like Slovenia, Croatia declared its independence from Yugoslavia on June 25th, 1991. Unlike Slovenia, however, the JNA fought a campaign of territorial conquest with much of the fighting revolving around protecting the Serb-dominated regions of Krajina and Slavonia.

Eastern Croatia and Krajina came under heavy conflict with JNA, Serbian irregulars, and Croatian ZNG all fighting over the same territory, despite the Brioni and the later Ohrid peace talks. The overmatched Croatian ZNG was unable to prevent a steady advance of Serb/JNA forces across Eastern Croatia and lost several villages to armored and infantry thrusts by August. The fighting also produced a significant refugee problem within Yugoslavia, with nearly 90,000 people being displaced internally and several thousand fleeing to Hungary.

By September, international pressure forced further EC-brokered ceasefire talks, but the ceasefires were unable to hold for more than a few hours. Croatians were able to regain some control over the fighting by blockading of 15 army bases, which quickly surrendered on September 15 with their equipment. That same day, the JNA bombed and shelled Ploce where Croatian forces had pillaged a naval base for weapons. On September 19, a JNA armored column also moved into Slavonia near Osijek to engage Croatian defenders in the heaviest fighting of the war and on September 22, they had gained control of Petrijna and several other towns. At this point, the JNA was suffering heavily from desertions and agreed to a ceasefire which lasted to month’s end. The ceasefire gave Croatian forces the opportunity to improve their positions by moving armored units and heavy artillery into new combat positions. Most of the Croatian equipment had been captured from the surrendered JNA bases.

When the fighting began again on October 1, the Croatians were in a much better position to stall the disintegrating JNA and Serbian forces. Croatian forces fought hard to capture JNA garrisons within Croatia. In response, the Yugoslav navy blockaded and attacked the Croatian ports of Dubrovnik, Ploce, Pula, Rujeka, Sebenik, Split, and Zadar, which created severe shortages of water and electricity in those cities. A few days later, on October 8, Croatia declared its independence.

Fighting would continue in Croatia until the beginning of the new year. HOS staged attacks into Serbia (November 5,6), Vukovar fell to Serbian forces (November 17), and the JNA launched renewed offensives against Dubrovnik, Osijek, Karlovac, and Sisak (December 27) while Croatia managed to recapture parts of western Slavonia (December 20). Then, on January 3, a lasting ceasefire ended the major fighting in Croatia as the United Nations granted recognition to Slovenia and Croatia. Although the ceasefire would be sporadically and continually violated in the coming months, the war in Croatia was over. Peace was ensured by the deployment in March of a 14,000-member UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to the regions of Slavonia and Krajina.


With its multiethnic population, it was only a matter of time before Bosnia-Hercegovina became the scene of bitter ethnic fighting in the war of Yugoslavian dissolution. The people of Bosnia consist primarily of Muslims but with Serbs and Croats both strongly represented in the balance. But ethnic fighting is a deceptive term, implying that there is no greater purpose to the war than killing one’s neighbors. The Bosnian war was not about ethnic hatreds and the term was used only as post-facto justification. Instead, the war occurred because of a mix of irredentism and expansionism.

By January 1992, the Serbian leadership knew that Yugoslavia no longer existed except as “Greater Serbia” and their main concern then became the enlarging of Serbian lands so that they would have the biggest territory when the ashes settled. Bosnia, with its large Serbian population and borders to Krajina would have appeared the best region for a territorial war.

The Bosnian government had made legislative changes to prepare for independence in October 1991 with an independence plebiscite held on November 9-12. The people of the republic voted overwhelmingly for independence, although it was claimed that the Serb-dominated Krajna (sic) had voted 90% in favor of remaining with Yugoslavia. This split was enough to frighten the European Community from granting Bosnia-Hercegovina international recognition in January 1992, in the belief that doing so would lead to ethnic fighting. This did not prevent the Serbs from declaring the Autonomous Republic of the Serbian People of Bosnia-Hercegovina on January 9 and removing themselves from independence debates in the Bosnian government.

Tensions would increase between the three ethnic groups in Bosnia. On February 24, a bomb injured 12 people in an Odzak Croatian Cultural Center. Three days later, another bomb in Banja Luca damaged the central mosque. Tensions would rise even higher following a February 29-March 1 referendum on independence when 99.4% of the voters preferred independence. Bosnian Serbs boycotted the vote and Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic said that an independent Bosnia was unacceptable and there were several clashes between Serbs and Muslims in Sarajevo and Bosanski Brod. This did not stop Bosnian President Alija Izbetgovic from proclaiming the republic’s independence on March 3.

Although diplomacy would defuse the tensions for the next few weeks, by month’s end, fighting had broken out between Bosnian Serbs and Croats in Bosanski Brod and Neum. On March 27, the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina and its loyalty to Yugoslavia were proclaimed.

Amid intensifying fighting in April, Bosnia-Hercegovina received international recognition. The fighting occurred all across the new republic, with Serbs attempting to capture and hold territory where possible. The goal of the Serbs at this point was to open an overland corridor from Serbia to Bosanska Krajina and the Serbian Republic of Krajina in Croatia and in this they had succeeded by month’s end. They captured Zvornik, Srebrenica, and Bratunac and were poised to besiege and shell Sarajevo by April 21.

The fighting in Bosnia then settled into a pattern of intense fighting broken by short-lived ceasefires as the war became a state of siege against the Bosniak and Croat citizens of Bosnia-Hercegovina. In May, the JNA forces, which had been supporting the Bosnian Serbs, had all non-Bosnian members recalled to Yugoslavia. This left 55,000 Bosnian Serb JNA members still in Bosnia and they and their equipment were assigned to the Bosnian Serb Army.

Then in June, Federal Croatian forces entered Bosnia in force to assist Bosnian Croats in expanding Croat-held territor­ies around Bosanski Brod, Mostar, and Travnik, thus creating the Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosna. This came as a shock to the Bosnian Muslim forces who had previously considered the Croatians as allies. Instead, the Croatians seemed to be cooperating with Serbs in carving up Bosnia. The creation of Herzeg-Bosna was welcomed by Bosnian Serbs as legitimizing their territorial conquests and the creation of ethnic cantons. Muslims treated Herzeg-Bosna as illegal, but did not have the military or political assets to dispute it. Muslim control of Bosnia had by this point shrank to holding the cities of Tuzla, Zenica, Sarajevo, Visegrad, and Gorazde as well as a small pocket north of Bihac. The rest of the nation was split between Serbs and Croats.

Fighting would continue interminably over the summer, although the establishment of a UNPROFOR base at the Sarajevo airport by Canadian and French peacekeepers to permit entry of relief flights was one moment of brightness. The UNPROFOR peacekeepers would be replaced a month later by French, Ukranian, and Egyptian forces who would continue the dispersal of relief supplies to Bosnian citizens over the coming months.

Despite the presence of UNPROFOR in Sarajevo, a lasting peace is not readily forseeable. Peace, when it comes, will have to be a diplomatic, rather than military, solution because none of the belligerents in Bosnia-Hercegovina have the military resources to create their own peace and all are on precarious political and economic footings. However, a diplomatic peace effort is also begarred by the results of the war. Both Bosnian Serbs and Croats have peace plans calling for ethnic cantonments based on the territories they have captured. Bosnian Muslims, however, who make up the majority of the population would be dispossessed under such a plan, which would legitimize Serb and Croat land grabs and the creation of as many as 1 Million Bosniak refugees. To bolster its case for cantonments, the Bosnian Serbs have been engaging in “ethnic cleansing,” which involves forcibly evicting non-Serb residents from Serb-held regions, creating even more refugees.

Many of the refugees have fled to Hungary, Croatia, and Kosovo. Others remain in Bosnia, unable to leave, and ill prepared for the coming winter.

In the long term, the continued fighting in Bosnia must end. No war can continue forever. The only questions are when, and how many will have to die first. This war simply becomes another justification for Blood Vengeance in the next round of fighting.


During the war of Yugoslavian dissolution, there were several military and paramilitary forces operating within the Yugoslavian republics. These ranged from the remnants of the Federal Yugo­slavian Armed Forces to National Guard forces of the breakaway republics. As the war progressed, military forces fragmented along first ethnic, and then political lines. The war itself devolved into numerous small-unit actions and artillery bombardments. Each of the major combatants is examined below.


Federal Yugoslavian and Serbian Forces engaged in joint operations in 1991 and 1992 in an attempt to prevent the dissolution of Yugoslavia and to attempt to place Yugoslavia under Serbian dominion. The interoperability of these forces was based both upon the Yugoslavian military doctrine of Total National Defence and the ethnic similarity of their command. Since 1953, the officer corps and command structures of the Yugoslavian National Army had come to be dominated by Serbians and Montenegrins, while the Serbian Forces were an ethnically-organized militia. The military structures and doctrines of Yugoslavian and Serbian forces are examined below.

Army of the Republic of Yugoslavia

The Yugoslavian National Army (JNA), also known as the Yugoslavian Peoples’ Army (YPA), had a unique operational doctrine for a conventional military force. Yugoslavia based its defence doctrine upon the concept of Total National Defence (TND), which drew upon Yugoslavia’s rich partisan history during World War II. TND gave the JNA the role of defending borders against aggressors with the intention of delaying an invader long enough for Territorial Defence Forces (TDF) to enter the field and start wearing the invader down with partisan tactics. The entire Yugoslavian population under TND was to be engaged in armed resistance, armaments production, and civil defence. TND was believed by the Yugoslavian planners to be the best method by which a smaller nation could properly defend itself against a much stronger invader.

Ironically, the TND concept proved to be a catalyst in tearing the Yugoslavian nation apart in the bloody separatist battles of 1991 and 1992. The TDF were organized along social/political lines with each Republic, province, and commune possessing its own TDF elements. Unlike the JNA, which integrated all nationalities below the officer level, the disparate TDF elements were usually ethnically homogenous, and would form the base of nationalist resistance to the Yugoslavian Federation.

Each TDF force was split into manouverable and spatial elements. Under TND, manouverable elements were to act as mobile partisan squads, while the smaller spatial elements protected key locations and defended the population. The battalion-sized manouverable elements were under the control of republic staffs and these were the units which formed the armies of the breakaway republics.

The JNA itself was organized under six districts, based at Belgrade, Skopje, Split, Zagreb, Sarajevo, and Ljubljana. Before the war, the JNA fielded a large force, with some 213,500 people under arms and 575,000 reservists. The TDF fielded as many as one million personnel. The JNA organization is given on the table below.

Table of Yugoslavian National Army Composition


Infantry Divisions


Mechanized Infantry Brigades


 Motorized Infantry Brigades


Light Brigades


Mountain Brigades


Independent Tank Brigades


Artillery Regiments


Antitank Regiments


Antiaircraft Artillery Regiments


Antiaircraft Missile Regiments

As the war of Yugoslavian dissolution progressed, the JNA found itself being weakened, not only through the usual casualties and desertions accompanying an inter-ethic war, but also because JNA conscripts in Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, and Bosnia-Hercegovina refused to enter the ranks. The JNA slowly became a Serb/Montenegrin organization, and even these ethnic groups were wont to desert when they grew weary of the fighting.

Weapons and Equipment: JNA and TDF equipment consisted of material ranging in vintage from World War II to the present. Main Battle Tanks (MBTs) were primarily the older Soviet T-54/T-55 series, but the Yugoslavian State Factories were also producing the newer M-84 MBT, which was a licensed copy of the Soviet T-72M MBT (also known as the T-74). Other tanks in active service were the American M-47 Patton, and the Soviet PT-76 Light Amphibious Tank. As the war went on, World War II era T-34/85 Soviet tanks were pressed into service. Most tanks were organized into tank battalions attached to infantry divisions or regiments. Eight independent tank regiments consisting of one heavy tank battalion using M-84s and two regular tank battalions using T-55s were also fielded. Each tank battalion was organized along Soviet lines, with a headquarters tank over three companies of ten tanks each.

Armored personnel carriers were mainly locally produced BVP M80A and M60 APCs and BOV-M armored cars. Older Soviet equipment like BTR-60/-50/-40s as well as American M-3A1 halftracks and M-8 Greyhound armored cars were also in service. Soviet BRDM-2 vehicles were used for reconnaissance.

Helicopter support provided by the Yugoslavian Air Force consisted of Aerospatiale SA-341 Gazelles produced under license in Yugoslavia as the ”Partizan• and Mil Mi-8 Hip Transport helicopters. The air force also provided close air support over the combat zones with the Yugoslav-produced Galeb/Jastreb, Kraguj, and Soko IAR-93B Orao 2 and Soviet-made MiG-21F and MiG-21U jets.

However, the Yugoslavian war was not a mobile war. Infantry and artillery ruled the battlefield, with tanks being pressed into service as self-propelled artillery. Other artillery consisted of D-30 and 2S1 (SAU-122) 122mm howitzers, M-101 105mm, and M65 and M-114 155mm Howitzers. There was a strong reliance on mortars, primarily the Soviet M-38 82mm and M-43 120mm types.

Yugoslavia also produced its own copy of the Brandt MO-120-AM50 120mm Mortar. Direct fire antitank guns included the 75mm M-1943, the 90mm M63B2, and the 100mm T-12.

JNA infantry weapons were primarily Warsaw Pact and locally-produced weapons, including AK-47s (called M-70 Zastavars) and AMD-65s assault rifles as well as the Soviet SVD sniper rifle and Tokarev TT33 (M-65) 9mm pistol. The JNA also fielded RPK (M-65B) light machineguns and relied upon the M53 SARAC (local copy of German MG-42 World War II-era MG), the German MG-3, and the Soviet PKM for heavier machineguns. Explosive infantry weapons included the local M-79 Osser 90mm rocket launcher and the M-71 LRL 128mm indirect fire rocket launcher.  Yugoslavia also relied quite heavily on older recoilless artillery and anti-tank launchers in the past, but these have not had much of a profile in media reports on the fighting, leading to the assumption that many had been retired and replaced by more modern rocket and missile launchers. Recoilless launchers included the 82mm M-60PB, the 57mm M-18, and the 105mm M-65. Anti-tank missiles included the AT-1 Snapper and the AT-2/AT-3 Sagger.

Rechristening: With the formation of the Federal Yugoslavian Republic (FRY) on April 27, 1992, the JNA was renamed the Army of the Republic of Yugoslavia, and was supposed to operate only on FRY territory, theoretically preventing any Army operations in Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Hercegovina, or Macedonia.

Serbian TDF

The Serbian TDF was the official military force of the Serbian republic and operated very closely with the JNA. The Serbian TDF was a militia/partisan structure under the TND concept which dominated Yugoslavian military structures for several decades and the TDF’s role was to assist in the defence of Serbia against foreign invasion. However, when the Yugoslav nation began its devolution, TDF units quickly became official armies for the breakaway republics and at this time, the Serbian government obtained control of the elements comprising the Serbian TDF.

Serbian TDF weapons were identical to JNA arms, although the TDF, being oriented towards small-unit operations, would have focused on infantry weapons. Because of the closeness of the Serbian TDF and the JNA, Serbian TDF units were much better equipped and trained than other TDFs.

Serbian Irregulars

The term irregular was applied very liberally to many non-JNA units operating in Yugoslavia and often encompassed government-controlled Territorial Defence Forces. In proper use, the term “irregular” should only apply to independent paramilitary forces.

The most prominent group of irregulars in Yugoslavia was the Cetnik movement. They were a wing of Vojislav Seselj’s Serbian Radical Party and operated in the partisan or marauder style, much like their World War II namesakes. The original Cetniks were nationalist Serbian partisans led by General Drazha Mihailovic fighting against Nazi German occupa¬tion. The original Cetniks were eradicated by Tito’s partisans following World War II.

Although Croatians used “Cetnik” to refer to both all Serbian irregulars and as a synonym for fascists or hardcore Marxists, the Cetniks were only one group of Serbian irregulars operating in Yugoslavia. Others prominent irregulars included the White Eagles under the command of Dragoslav Bokan and the Serbian Tigers of Zeljko (Arkan) Raznatovic.

Finally, there were irregulars which claimed to be the armies defending independent Serbian republics liberated from Bosnian or Croatian territory.  These included the Army of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina under the command of Radovan Karadzic and General Ratko Mladic and the Army of the Serbian Republic of Krajina. All of these irregulars, because of the close Serbian ties to the JNA, operated with arms and even armor and artillery equal to those of the JNA and relied on the JNA for air support. They also fielded civilian or irregular weapons where military weapons were unavailable.

Serbian Special Force

The Serbian military announced the formation of a Special Force of 20,000 “well-trained” troops on November 7, 1991. The exact role of this force has not been reported to date, although the name suggests elite force style missions, ranging from intense partisan warfare to internal security operations. A more likely role would be as a politically reliable and militarily effective guards unit, receiving the best equipment and personnel.


The Republic of Slovenia was the first Republic to break away from Yugoslavia, and also the first to suffer attack by JNA and Serbian troops seeking to preserve Yugoslavian ”jedenstovo” (unity). It was also the first republic to cement its independence with strong resistance and an effective and lasting ceasefire.

Slovenian TDF

The Slovenian Territorial Defence Force was organized along the same lines as other Yugoslavian TDFs, but in combat, the Slovenian TDF responded with well-trained and well-organized troops. In this sense, the Slovenian TDF was not the partisan militia that TND envisioned, but was the full-fledged republican army that Serbia feared. JNA troops in Slovenia found their ground assault facing heavy resistance, and then found their positions besieged by the Slovenian TDF.

Slovenian TDF units equipped themselves from Slovenian-based JNA and TDF armories and from weapons captured from JNA forces, so they used the same weapons and vehicles as the JNA, as well as any weapons which they were able to import from other nations.

The current Slovenian Army is now making use of JNA equipment handed over to them on the JNA withdrawl of October 25, 1992.

Slovenian and Croatian Special Forces

Given that the TDF structure did not allow for the formation of Western-style elite units, the sparse media references to Slovenian and Croatian Special Forces are a mystery. Of the two nations, Slovenia had a more professional TDF organization, so it is possible that elite units were organized from the best trained of Slovenian TDF troops to act as “palace guards” and partisan raiders, much like the Serbian Special Force (see above).

Croatian Special Forces, on the other hand, were likely Special Forces in name only, trading on the mystique surrounding elite units. Croatian “Zebras”, as they called themselves, were probably little more than a splinter of Croat irregulars or ZNG units. The organization of the Croatian ZNG and the splintering of Croat resistance along political lines precluded the estab­lishment and training of traditional “elite” units.


The resistance units which saw the most of the fighting in the war of Yugoslavian dissolution were the various Croatian militias. The fighting within Croatia lasted for several months and even spilled over into Serbia. Croatian units were also active in Bosnia-Hercegovina following the republic’s move to independence and were instrumental in carving the state of Herzeg-Bosna out of the old borders of Bosnia-Hercegovina.

Croatian TDF/ZNG

On April 11, 1991 the Croatian Territorial Defence Force became the cadre for the Croatian National Guard Corps or ZNG. The ZNG later filled the role of the republic’s army and was the main force of resistance to JNA and Serbian invasion. The ZNG came under the command of the Croatian ”Ministartvo Obrane” (Defence Ministry).

During the course of the war, the ZNG proved capable of fighting the JNA and Serbian forces to a standstill, but nothing more. The ZNG was primarily an infantry-based organization which used captured JNA weapons and artillery pieces where avail­able. Its infantry weapons were likewise primarily those of the JNA and civilian and irregular units (see below), although Croatian leaders, after scouring world arms markets, were able to procure a large amount of Ultimax 100 Squad Assault Weapons manufactured by Chartered Industries of Singapore. Other infantry weapons, primarily Soviet-designed, were imported from Hungary, Romania, and other former Eastern Bloc nations.

Armored Units: Although very rare, Croatian ZNG armor did operate in small units distributed throughout the Croatian theatre. Any armored vehicles the Croatians possessed consisted of captured JNA equipment or civilian vehicles. Tanks used by the Croatians included sparse collections of T-54/T-55 MBTs, M-84 MBTs, and whole units of T-34/85 World War II tanks. Armored Personnel Carriers included BVP M80As, M-60s, BOVs, BTR-60s, and BTR-40s, as well as civilian trucks and farm tractors which had steel plate welded on as expedient armor.

Croatian HOS and Irregulars

The political splintering of the Croatian military forces meant that there were several unofficial Croatian paramilitary forces operating as irregulars through the course of the war. The most prominent of the irregular units was the HOS, which was the military wing of the ”Hrvatska Stranka Prava” (HSP)–the Croatian Party of Rights or Croatian Party of Justice, depending on the translation. The HSP/HOS were an extreme right-wing organization which organized and fought independently of the actions of the Croatian government and even engaged in attacks in the Republic of Serbia. Naturally, this caused a great deal of friction between the HSP/HOS and the ZNG, and Dobroslav Paraga, the HSP leader, was arrested in November 1991 on charges of trying to overthrow the Croatian government.

The HSP/HOS appeared to be a resurrection of the Ustase radical movement of World War II. The Ustase were a fascist terrorist group installed as the government of independent Croatia following Hitler’s invasion of April 6, 1941. The Ustase militia terrorized the civilian population, but their most terrible crimes included the mass extermination of Orthodox Serbians and Croatian Jews with such brutality that even German and Italian officials were horrified.

HOS used weaponry similar to the ZNG, although frictions between the two organizations have probably meant that the HOS had been forced to limit itself to civilian and irregular weaponry or to cultivate other sources for its arms. HOS was primarily an infantry organization, but did use captured armored vehicles in a defensive role. HOS units engaged in both guerrilla infantry attacks on Serbian and JNA positions and villages, and also defended several village strongholds in Croatia.Üd[1][1]ÜŒ Croatian Specijalci and Milicija.

Many of the early clashes preceding Croatian independence occurred between Croatian ”Milicija” (police) forces and armed Serbian insurgents operating in the Serbian-dominated regions of Croatia. In response to Serbian insurrection, Croatian extremists, including those in the ruling Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) armed themselves and the Croatian government formed a special paramilitary police reserve known as the ”Specijalici”, an internal security force. Although the ”Specijalici” were demobilized in January 1991 to forestall a crackdown by the JNA, they were not disbanded and appeared two months later at Pakrac, acting as riot police in concert with the ”Milicija”. The Croatian police forces there cracked down heavily on Serbian separatists until replaced and forced out of the fighting by JNA forces.

Croatian International Brigade

The Croatian International Brigade was an irregular Croatian infantry unit which was composed of expatriate Croatians and non-Croatian mercenaries acting as cadre for local Croatian units. In practice, the Zagreb International Brigade acted as a receiving area for “imported” troops before assigning them to disparate Croatian ZNG and ”Samb” (independent) units. The International Brigade also referred to all “imported” troops, regardless of their actual unit assignment. The Internationals were of varying quality, ranging from untrained teenagers to professional soldiers. In a sense, they were much like the mercenaries and adventurers who fought the Fascists in the Spanish Civil War.

Weapons consisted of a varying mix of civilian weapons and Croatian military weapons.


To understand the warfare in Bosnia-Hercegovina, one must be aware that there were three distinct ethnically-based forces fighting for the same land. Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks) made up just over half of the population of Bosnia-Hercegovina, with the balance composed of Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats in roughly equal numbers. The forces fighting in Bosnia are summarized below.

Serbian forces operating in Bosnia-Hercegovina included the JNA, who contributed 55,000 Bosnian-Serb troops as well as artillery and armor. The JNA forces were subordinated to the 100,000 strong Bosnian Serb Army commanded by Karadzic and Mladic, leaders of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina. Serbian irregulars also joined the fighting and included the Cetniks, Krajinan Serb volunteers, White Eagles, and Serbian Tigers. Although the irregulars were not officially under the command of the Bosnian Serb Army, they did receive aid and arms from Serbia.

Croatian forces in Bosnia-Hercegovina were mainly Bosnian Croats and included the Croatian Defence Council (HVO) and the Croatian Democratic Union. HOS units were also present, and although the Croatian government denied the reports, Croatian ZNG troops were said to be present in Herzeg-Bosna and near Sarajevo.

Bosnian government forces included the 120,000-strong Bosnian TDF which is a poorly-trained and poorly-equipped militia organization, and the 70,000 strong multiethnic Bosnian Police.

Independent units included the Muslim Patriotic League and the Bosnian Green Berets, which were the military wing of the ethnically-Muslim Party of Democratic Action (SDA).


Macedonian Armed Forces consist of the old Macedonian TDF and have been subordinate to the Macedonian government since January 1992. They have used JNA equipment turned over to them when the JNA pulled out on March 26, 1992.

Macedonia was not involved in the fighting surrounding the war of Yugoslavian dissolution and its independence came peacefully. However, the independence of Macedonia has angered Greece, and worried Bulgaria. Also, Macedonian Albanikos have started agitating for independence. So, given these factors the peacefully-born Macedonian Army will be tasked with border defence and internal security responsibilities for the forseeable future.


Combatants in Yugoslavia, and especially Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina, used a mix of weapons from a variety of sources. Although the primary weapons were those captured from JNA forces and arsenals, several others were imported by Croatia prior to an European Community arms embargo, while others were older weapons relegated to TDF arsenals.

The most common irregulars’ weapon was the Soviet-designed AK-47, and these were brought in from Hungary, Romania, and Czechoslovakia. German made G-3s and Argentinian produced FN-FAL Para Modelo IIIs were also present in quantity, and photographs showed combatants with Italian SPAS-12 shotguns, Czechoslovak-produced MGV 176 copies of the American AMD-180 submachineguns, and Soviet PPSh-43 submachineguns. Irregulars in Croatia also made extensive use of the Singaporan Ultimax 100 Squad Assault Weapon.

Civilian Weapons were pressed into military service, ranging from the new Croatian-produced HS-91 9mm submachinegun, to the World War II era Mauser Kar98K rifles. American-made hunting rifles in calibers ranging from .22 LR to Remington 7mm Magnum and beyond were used extensively when military weapons were unavailable.

On a much smaller scale, expedient firearms improvised out of steel pipe saw use in the most desperate areas. These included homemade pistols, rifles, and shotguns, including shotgun revolvers, and were as dangerous to the firer as to the tar­get. Improvised firearms have never been particularly effective when compared with modern weapons, but their danger on the battlefield should never be underestimated.


In 1992, I had completed a second scenario pack for LEG called Welcome to Hell: War In the Balkans Scenario Pack. The scenario pack dealt with the breakup of Yugoslavia. These traumatic events were the consequence of the fall of the Soviet Union, which saw the Warsaw Pact crumble and collapse as a wave of reform and revolution swept through Eastern Europe.

LEG ceased operations before the manuscript could be completed. Reproduced in full on these pages is the entire Welcome to Hell scenario pack.


Welcome to Hell - Ruins of Sarajevo - Phoenix Command Scenario Pack

Welcome to Hell - Ruins of Sarajevo - Phoenix Command Scenario Pack

The Balkan Peninsula has written much of European and even World history. The cultural diversity of the people of the Peninsula has led to substantial internal ethnic friction over time while the location of the Peninsula on the borders of Europe and Southwest Asia has meant that the region has been used as a staging area for conquerors on both borders seeking to invade and rule lands on the other side. Both internal and external belligerence gained the Balkans the title of “powderkeg of Europe,” a title which has proved apt over time as irredentist and nationalist pressures have kept the region in perpetual conflict.

Now, with the removal of Communism throughout Eastern Europe and the Balkans, the people of the Balkans are beginning to find their independent political identity in the World, and this has thrown the Balkan nations into turmoil.

In Romania, a vicious dictator was removed by a popular uprising. In Yugoslavia, the old borders have been torn apart in a bloody civil war by people eager to express their nationalism. And all across the Balkans, the decades of communism have left a legacy of refugees, economic ruin, and political uncertainty. These, combined with the blood spilled in the bitter ethnic and revolutionary fighting have started the fuse on the powderkeg burning again, and while there is little risk of the keg detonating another World War, even local explosions have proved to generate terrible misery and significant international repercussions.

This scenario pack features a mix of scenarios for the Small Arms and Mechanized Combat System scenarios, allowing the supplement to be used with both.

Perspectives on the Balkans

The historical chronicle of the Balkan peninsula is fascinating not only for the factual record of events it encompasses, but also for the cultural and philosophical insights it provides into the current ethnic and political conflicts sweeping across the region. This section provides an overview of Balkan history and examines how that history has contributed to the current strife.

Histories of Nationalism and Irredentism

The current ethnic tensions in the region are driven by the twin forces of nationalism and irredentism. Nationalism, the desire of an ethnic group to have a nation of their own both combines and competes with irredentism, which is the concept that areas settled by an ethnic group should be ruled by that ethnic group. Balkan history is filled with instances of ethnic clashes caused by nationalist and irredentist motives.

Balkan History and Geography offer an explanation for the strength of nationalist and irredentist movements in the region. Following the collapse of the Western Roman Empire and the barbarian invasions of the Byzantine Empire in the fifth to seventh centuries, the northern Balkan peninsula was left sparsely-populated and became settled by Slav and Bulgar peoples. The first Slavs in the regions were vassals of the Avars, a Turkic people from Russia and they engaged in raiding the Byzantine empire. The Avars were defeated by the Byzantines and Slavic tribes of Serbs and Croats were invited by Byzantine Emporer Heraclius to settle in the Balkans in A.D. 626. These tribes settled in Dalmatia and present-day Serbia and Croatia. The fall of the Avars also permitted their vassals the Bulgars, a Turkic tribe, to conquer Slavs in the eastern Bal­kans. The pattern of resettlement and conquest displaced the Thracian population of Dacia and the Illyrian population of the Southern Balkans. These people would eventually become Vlachs (Romanians) and Albanians.

Over the next several centuries, the various Balkan groups engaged in empire building and were themselves the subjects of larger empires. Bulgarians and Serbs expanded their holdings until finally joined into the Ottoman empire. Bulgaria fell to the Ottomans in A.D. 1396 following political and economic destabilization from a succession crisis and Mongol raids of a century before. Serbia itself broke away from the Byzantine Empire in A.D. 1180 and began building its own empire under Stefan Dusan in 1331, eventually encompassing Albania, Epirus, Thessaly, and Bulgaria. But in 1389, the Ottoman Turks defeated the Serbs at Kosovo, fragmenting the Serbian empire into tiny holdings and all of Serbia except Montenegro was swallowed by the Ottomans. Unlike their southern neighbors, the Croatians and Dalmatians faced Frankish conquest, but would break away to form the independent kingdom of Croatia in 925. Croatia would remain independent until a succession crisis permitted Hungarian King Ladislas I to take the throne in 1089, effectively making Croatia  a province of Hungary. Hungary would also later fall under to the Ottomans in 1526, bringing all of the Balkan states under Ottoman dominion.

The geographical and cultural boundaries which had existed in the Balkan peninsula and had allowed the development of unique ethnic identities for many of the Balkan peoples were superceded by the Ottoman conquest. During the Ottoman rule, a great deal of internal migration took place as required by the dictates of the Empire and of Commerce. The internal migration served to muddy the national boundaries and provided a stong breeding ground for irredentist politics.

By the 19th Century, many Balkan nations were able to gain their modern political identity with the slow collapse of the Ottoman Empire. This brought the Balkans to the forefront of Western European concern. The strategic location of the Balkans made them important to Russia and Habsburg Austria as frontier territories, to Britain as a communications link with its far Eastern colonies, and to the Ottomans themselves, who on seeing the decline of their empire were unwilling to cede and more territory to their rivals. In the midst of the international concerns, Balkan nationalism rose to start the formation of independent states. Serbia staged an uprising in 1804-1813 that would eventually gain it autonomy in 1830, with Montenegro receiving international recognition as an independent state in 1860. The Greeks also engaged in revolution and civil war in the 1820s, gaining independence in 1830. Danubian principalities, which under the Crimean War’s Treaty of Paris were to remain separate, elected Alexandru Cuza as sole prince and achieved unification in 1861 to create Romania. Bulgarian revolutionaries used the new state of Romania as a staging area to throw off the Ottomans in 1875. Albania also had an insurrection in 1909-1912, but failed to achieve independence until 1926.

By the start of World War I, the Balkan Peninsula was a region of several small states each seeking to expand their own territories while simultaneously trying to prevent powers outside of the Balkans from exerting their influence. Several major crises occurred in the period before the wars, but the most serious was the 1908 Austrian annexation of Bosnia-Hercegovina from the Turks, an action protested by all the then-independent Balkan states. Austria and Serbia almost went to war over the issue, and could have drawn in the whole of Europe as many of the treaty obligations which contributed to the expansion of World War I were already in place. Two Balkan wars would be fought before the start of the Great War. The first Balkan War (1912) removed the remnants of Turkish rule from Europe in a battle between Turkey on the one side and the nations of Serbia,

Bulgaria, Montenegro, and Greece on the other. Great Power diplomats brokered a peace unsatisfactory to Serbia and Bulgaria, and these two former allies fought each other in the Second Balkan War (1913). Serbia, Greece, and Turkey were eventually able to beat Bulgaria into submission and gained substantial territorial concessions from the defeated nation.

By the end of all of this history, the forces of nationalism and irredentism had permanently marked the face of the Balkans. Nationalism gained the Balkan nations their indepen­dence, while irredentism threw them against one another. At this point, the stage was set for the start of the Great War.

Serbia had been angered over the Bosnian annexation and so supported Serbian independence movements within Bosnia-Hercegovina. One of which, the Black Hand under the command of Serbian Colonel Dragutin Dimitrijevic, would finally start the war when their Bosnian Serb member Gavrilo Pricip assassinated the Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife Sophie duchess of Hohenburg on June 28, 1914. The Powderkeg of Europe had exploded into the Great War.

Diplomatic Solutions

Following the Great War, the victorious Allied nations attempted to divide the Balkans in a way that would stabilize the region for the forseeable future. Many borders were redrawn as territor­ies were taken from central power allies and given to Entente allies. The old Austro-Hungarian empire was shattered.  Transylvania was given over to Romania, and Slovenia and Croatia were surrendered to the Serbians and rearranged into Yugoslavia, the South Slav state. Greece received Western Thrace from Bulgaria and Eastern Thrace and Smyrna from Turkey. The Diplomats, in proposing this solution, failed to take into account the strong nationalism of the minorities in the South Balkans, which would lead to the Greco-Turk War, which led to a solid defeat for the expansionist Greeks.

In the rest of the Balkans, nationalism also caused interwar friction. The rise of peasantist, communist, and later fascist organizations along ethnic lines in Yugoslavia, Romania, Bulgaria, and Albania led to the collapse of parliamentary breakdowns in those nations, creating effectively authoritarian states. Rather than stabilizing the region, the rise of authoritarianism led to even more unrest.

Yugoslavia’s king Alexander was assassinated in 1934 by IMRO Macedonian revolutionaries, forcing his brother Paul to take power as regent. Greece suffered repeated Coup-d’etats. King Carol II of Romania waged a covert war against Corneilu Codreanu and his Iron Guard fascists. King Boris III of Bulgaria launched a military coup which drove IMRO revolutionaries from his country.

All of these revolutionary and nationalist tensions would be stilled for the next fifty years by events transpiring far beyond the Balkan Peninsula, first by the arrival of World War II, and then by the post-war Communist governments in Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, and Yugoslavia during the Cold War.

Repression and Consequences

It was only the repression practiced by the former Soviet Bloc nations of the Balkan Peninsula that was able to mask and control much of the existing ethnic tension and keep the region from exploding into violence from 1945. Harsh object lessons like Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 emphasized that the Soviet Union would use military force to quickly and brutally crush dissent in its European Empire, and that the national governments had the military might of Moscow at their summons to help in controlling unrest. The threat of Soviet military intervention bolstered the repression of Eastern Bloc nations and controlled the simmering ethnic friction. But then came Soviet ”Perestroika” reforms, and the military threat evaporated as former Eastern Bloc nations began digging themselves out from over four decades of Communism and liberalizing their government structures. Much of the repression that had controlled ethnic tensions also disappeared, and in ethnically diverse regions such as the Balkan nations, the ethnic tensions became dangerously high.

Of course, there were governments which tried to continue their repression despite the lack of Soviet support. In Bulgaria, the slow reform process under President Todor Zhivkov tried to assimilate Bulgarian Turks, resulting in Turkish protests, police crackdowns, and a 300,000 member exodus across the Turkish border. The domestic and international censure Bulgaria received for bringing about the exodus eventually forced Zhivkov’s resignation and the liberalization of Bulgaria. In Romania, leader Nicolae Ceausescu bled his nation white of assets to attempt to repay foreign debts and forced the Romanian people through a bizarre systemization policy of destroying villages and settling the residents in urban apartment complexes. Ceausescu paraded himself as absolute leader of his nation, but when demonstrators attempting to block the arrest of Hungarian priest Laszlo Tokes were shot and killed by Securitate, Ceausescu was removed from power in a bloody week-long revolt by protestors no longer facing Soviet military intervention.

Another nation, however, found that the ethnic tensions which had been controlled by the central socialist government were strong enough to tear the nation apart. Yugoslavia in 1991 found that several of its component republics wanted independence and for a while, the central government fought to keep the nation together. Eventually, the central government itself was replaced by a Serbian command, which used the Army and irregular forces to realize Serbian territorial claims. Yugoslavia which was born out of the First World War as an amalgam of several smaller republics had disintegrated some seventy years later in a fit of irredentist bloodletting.



FN SCAR-H Data provided by RJ AndronFN SCAR-H: The FN Special Operations Forces Combat Assault Rifle (SCAR) was manufactured by FN for the US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) in 2007, and is currently in service with USSOCOM and the 75th Ranger Regiment.

The FN SCAR-H or Mk17 is chambered for 7.62x51mm NATO. Another version, designated SCAR-L or Mk16 is chambered for 5.56mm NATO, but USSOCOM has cancelled the acquisition of the SCAR-L and is instead purchasing the SCAR-H.

Assault Rifle
7.62mm NATO
   Physical Aim Ballistic Data
     Data Time Range in 2 yard Hexes
AC ALM 10 20 40 70 100 200 300 400
L 30/39 1 -23 FMJ PEN 18 17 16 13 12 7 4 3
W 9.9 2 -13 DC 7 6 6 5 4 3 2 1
3 -9
RT 8 4 -7 JHP PEN 17 16 15 13 11 7 4 2
ROF *5 5 -6 DC 8 8 7 6 5 3 2 1
6 -5
Cap 20 7 -4 AP PEN 26 25 22 19 17 10 6 4
AW 1.4 8 -3 DC 6 6 5 4 4 2 1 1
Mag 9 -2
10 -1 MA 0.6 1.2 2.4 4.2 6 12 18 24
KD 9 11 BA 61 53 45 37 32 23 17 13
SAB 5 12 TOF 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.8 1.0

Tavor TAR-21

Tavor TAR-21 Data provided by RJ Andron

Tavor TAR-21: The Tavor TAR-21 is a bullpup-style Israeli assault rifle that has seen service with the Israeli Givati and Golani Brigades and has entered service in several other nations as well, including Azerbaijan, Colombia, Eithiopia, Georgia, Thailand, and the Ukraine, among others. India produces its own version of the MTAR-21 (Micro-Tavor) called the Zittara chambered for the Indian 5.56x30mm cartridge. A shorter version, called the MTAR-21, is slated to be the standard assault rifle of the Israeli Defence Forces.

The weapon has an integral red dot sight and laser and can mount Holographic or other sights. The aim time data assumes that the optical sights are used. If the optical sights are not used and the shooter has to resort to using the iron sights, then the Maximum Aim Time limited to 4 AC.


Tavor TAR-21
Assault Rifle
5.56mm NATO
Physical Aim Ballistic Data
Data Time Range in 2 yard Hexes
AC ALM 10 20 40 70 100 200 300 400
L 28 1 -22 FMJ PEN 15 14 13 11 10 6 4 2
W 7.2 2 -12 DC 6 5 5 4 4 2 1 1
3 -8
RT 10 4 -6 JHP PEN 15 14 12 11 9 6 3 2
ROF *6 5 -5 DC 7 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
6 -4
Cap 30 7 -3 AP PEN 22 21 19 16 14 8 5 3
AW 1 8 -2 DC 5 5 4 4 3 2 1 1
Mag 9 -1
10 MA 0.4 0.8 1.6 2.8 4 8 12 16
KD 4 11 BA 60 51 42 35 30 20 15 11
SAB 3 12 TOF 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.7 0.9

Winchester M1895 Russian

Data Provided by Eero Juhola

Winchester m/1895 Russian: Between 1915 and 1917 the Winchester Repeating Arms Company supplied Imperial Russia with some 300 000 Winchester rifles model 1895, i.e. the Winchester M95 Russian. Designed by John Browning, the gun fired the standard model 1908 7.62x53mm cartridge and had a magazine of four, with the fifth going into the barrel. Unlike earlier Winchesters, the m/1895 dispensed with the tubular magazine and used a regular box magazine loaded, in the Russian model at least, with a charging strip. Data is given for both original m/1908 and m/1930 heavy ball ammunition.

The rifle’s sights were graduated in arshins, an old Russian measurement corresponding to 71 cm (28 inches). The rifle could be fitted with a 52 cm (20 in) bayonet. Compared to a bolt action the rifle was probably more difficult to operate from a prone firing position but had an advantage if fired in any upright position in that the operator did not have to lift his head off the sights to cycle the action. The m/1895 has a sustained rate of fire of 56 rounds per minute.

The m/1895 is the strongest lever-action rifle ever made. For other markets, Winchester produced the rifle in 30-40 Krag, 30-03, 30-06, .303 British, 35 Winchester, 405 Winchester, 38-72, and 40-72  blackpowder calibers. The barrel lengths varied from the Rifle, with barrels from 22 to 28 inches long, to the Carbine, 22 inches, and the Musket (originally intended for Army sales) 24 to 30 inches. A total of 425 000 were made between 1895 and the early 1930s. The m/1895 was the Wimbledon Cup 1896 winner for the 1000 yard championship. Today, Browning offers a replica of the 1895 in .30-06 for about 1100 dollars.

Imperial Russian troops in Finland used the Winchester rifle among other types and both sides employed it in the Civil War of 1918. Due to its fine workmanship the rifle was highly valued but its small numbers and unusual mechanism relegated the type to reserve use only. Fewer than 4000 Winchesters survived the Civil War.

When the Winter War begun the Finns actually de-mothballed even these venerable weapons, though they were primarily distributed to artillery units and troops on the home front. The remaining 500 rifles were sold to civililians in the Fifties.

Some notes kindly provided by John T. Kwon

Winchester M1895 Russian
7.62 x 53 mm (7,62 kiv/Winchester)
Physical Aim Ballistic Data
Data Time Range in 2 yard Hexes
AC ALM 10 20 40 70 100 200 300 400
L 46.5 1 -23 m/08 PEN 20 19 17 15 13 7.6 4.6 2.8
W 9.5 2 -12 DC 8 8 8 8 8 7 7 6
3 -9
RT 7 4 -7 m/30 PEN 24 22 20 17 15 9 5.4 3.3
ROF 2 5 -6 DC 8 8 8 8 8 7 7 6
6 -5
Cap 5 7 -4 *JHP PEN 18 18 16 14 12 7.2 4.4 2.7
AW 0.3 8 -3 DC 10 9 9 9 9 9 8 8
cs 9 -2
10 -1 *AP PEN 29 27 24 21 18 11 6.6 4.0
KD 12 11 0 DC 8 8 8 8 7 7 7 6
BA 64 56 48 41 36 27 21 17
TOF 0 0 1 2 2 5 8 11


M27 IAR Data Provided by Eero Juhola

M27 IAR – Infantry Automatic Rifle: The M27 is the designation for a 5.56mm magazine fed weapon being acquired by the United States Marine Corps to supplant the M249 SAW in USMC service.

The IAR is based upon the HK 416 design but incorporates a heavier barrel. The IAR can use either the 30-round STANAG magazines, or the 100-round Beta-C Mag.

Aim time data is provided for the weapon in different configurations, including with and without bipod, with iron sights or optical sights, or with the 30-round or 100-round magazine

M27 IAR – Infantry Automatic Rifle
Squad Automatic Weapon
5.56mm NATO
Physical Aim Ballistic Data
Data Time Range in 2 yard Hexes
AC ALM 10 20 40 70 100 200 300 400
L 37/33 FMJ PEN 16.0 15.0 13.0 11.0 9.7 5.9 3.6 2.2
W 9/13 See below DC 6 6 6 5 5 4 3 2
RT 8 JHP PEN 15.0 15.0 13.0 11.0 9.2 5.6 3.4 2.1
ROF *5 DC 8 8 7 7 7 6 4 3
Cap 30/100 AP PEN 22.0 21.0 19.0 16.0 14.0 8.5 5.1 3.1
AW 1.0/4.6 DC 6 6 6 5 5 4 3 2
MA 0.2 0.4 0.8 1 2 4 6 8
KD 4 BA 60 51 42 35 30 20 15 11
SAB 2 TOF 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 2.0 5.0 7.0 11.0


Iron Sight Iron Sight Optical Sight Optical Sight
No Bipod Bipod No Bipod Bipod
30 Round Mag 30 Round Mag 30 Round Mag 30 Round Mag
1 -22 1 -23 1 -23 1 -23
2 -12 2 -12 2 -13 2 -13
3 -9 3 -9 3 -7 3 -7
4 -7 4 -7 4 -5 4 -5
5 -6 5 -6 5 -4 5 -4
6 -5 6 -4 6 -3 6 -3
7 -4 7 -3 7 -1 7 -1
8 -3 8 -2 8 0 8 0
9 -2 9 -1 9 1 9 1


Iron Sight Iron Sight Optical Sight Optical Sight
No Bipod Bipod No Bipod Bipod
100 Round Mag 100 Round Mag 100 Round Mag 100 Round Mag
1 -25 1 -25 1 -25 1 -25
2 -15 2 -15 2 -15 2 -15
3 -10 3 -10 3 -8 3 -8
4 -8 4 -8 4 -6 4 -6
5 -6 5 -6 5 -5 5 -5
6 -5 6 -5 6 -3 6 -3
7 -4 7 -4 7 -1 7 -1
8 -3 8 -3 8 -1 8 -1
9 -2 9 -2 9 1 9 1
Desert Eagle .50AE Data Provided by Greg Brovane

Desert Eagle .50AE: This is a large autoloader that is chambered for the .50in Action Express round based on the rugged Desert Eagle frame.

This round because of its slower speed packs less energy (2400J) than the Casull at 2800J.

Desert Eagle .50 AE
.50 Calibre Action Express
Physical Aim Ballistic Data
Data Time Range in 2 yard Hexes
AC ALM 10 20 40 70 100 200 300 400
L 10 1 -19 FMJ PEN 4.6 4.2 3.5 2.6 1.9 0.2
W 4.6 2 -12 DC 8 8 8 7 5 1
3 -10
RT 4 4 -9 JHP PEN 4.4 4.0 3.3 2.5 1.8 0.2
ROF * 5 -8 DC 9 9 9 8 7 1
6 -7
Cap 8 7 -6 AP PEN 6.0 5.5 4.5 3.3 2.5 0.3
AW 0.6 DC 8 8 8 7 5 1
KD 9 BA 53 44 35 28 23 16
SAB 7 TOF 0 1 2 3 7 38