"Armis Bella Non Venenis Geri"
-(War is waged with weapons, not with poisons) -- Ancient Roman
condemnation of well poisoning.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

"Only we can prevent forests"
-Operation Ranch Hand personnel motto

 

 

 

Chemical and Biological Warfare
Phoenix Command Weapon Systems Data Supplement

INTRODUCTION
The Chemical and Biological Warfare supplement for the Phoenix Command Combat System examines chemical and biological warfare agents able to be dispersed as gases, aerosols, or vapors and allows these agents to be incorporated into simulations of modern warfare. All known CBW agents likely to be stockpiled are detailed.

This rules set was originally designed in 1990, but never saw print. The rules are presented here for the first time.

Links:

Chapter 1: Dispersal and Protection
Chapter 2: Chemical Agents
Chapter 3: Biological Agents
Delivery Systems Effects Tables
Chemical Agent Effects Tables

Background:The Application of CBW

Chemical warfare in its modern form was first practiced on the trenches of Ypres in World War I, but the use of poisons to strike at the enemy has been employed since ancient times. The development of Chemical and Biological Warfare (CBW) before Ypres, however, remained relatively unchanged from the days of the well poisoners.

Early Uses:
It was a detested practice among ancient Greek and Roman armies to throw poisons, corpses, or other contaminants down wells to deny enemy use of them. However, well poisoning effectively destroyed the well and did not limit its attack to only enemy troops. Despite public condemnation, the tactic survived to the middle ages.
Another CBW tactic which saw wide use in the medieval period was the catapulting of diseased corpses into besieged fortresses. The disease would soon spread among the defenders and weaken them sufficiently for conventional forces to take the fortress. The Mongols, in their siege of the Crimean city of Kaffa in A.D. 1346, catapulted their own plague-ridden corpses over the city walls. The refugees from Kaffa travelled to Constantinople, Genoa, and Venice, and they carried the plague with them--possibly contributing to the Black Death outbreak three years later.
The earliest use of CBW as the sole weapon in a conflict was the attempted genocide of the Ohio Indians by the British governor Lord Amherst. Following an Indian rebellion in 1763, Amherst ordered two blankets and a hankerchief from a smallpox hospital to be sent as gifts to the Ohio tribe. Within a few months, a terrible smallpox epidemic had broken out and ravaged the tribe.
 
Modern Era:
While the early efforts in CBW relied almost exclusively on disease to weaken the enemy over a relatively long period of time, the rise of the European chemical industries meant that enemy troops could be incapacitated by new, fast-acting poisons dispersed as gases or aerosols. The entire focus of CBW shifted to the use of chemical agents.
By the late ninteenth century, the entire concept of CBW was viewed almost dilletantishly by the Europeans. No army had incorporated a "gas" or "chemical" force, and CBW was used haphazardly, when it was used at all. The British had authorized the use of noxious sulphur fumes in the siege of Sebastopol during the Crimean war, and they had fired experimental shells containing picric acid at the Boers during the second Anglo-Boer War. The French had developed tear gas projectors and grenades for riot control during this time.
Despite these developments, the various European armies looked down on CBW as being immoral and unchivalrous, an attitude that led to the 1899 Hague convention, Article 23, which supposedly banned all projectiles whose sole purpose was the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases.
In World War I, Article 23 was shown to be worthless. Fritz Haber, head of the German Chemical Warfare Service, convinced the German Imperial Army to try his gas weapons as a means of breaking through the Allied front lines. The test was performed at Ypres, on April 22, 1915, when German pioneers uncapped bottles of Chlorine gas, and allowed the wind to carry the green chemical cloud across the Allied troops stationed there. The initial shock of the gas attack was not exploited by the German command, and the front lines remained unchanged.
What had changed was the attitude of the belligerents toward CBW. The attitudes that had brought about the Hague convention had been thrown aside at Ypres as the Allies set about working on gas defence and gas offence. The following years of the war saw the introduction of new delivery and protection systems and gases, like phosgene, chlorpicrin, and mustard gas.
While the armies and politicians seemed to adopt chemical weapons, the general public viewed them with revulsion. Chemical weapons were the first true weapons of indiscriminate and mass destruction, and the public saw their effects firsthand when the casualties returned home. This attitude did not stop the various governments involved from embarking on chemical weapons programs after the war. These programs continued despite the 1925 Geneva convention which was supposed to ban the use of such weapons. In World War II, chemical and biological weapons were not used. However, both Axis and Allied powers experimented with and developed chemical and biological agents.
In an arms race overshadowed by that of nuclear arms, chemical and biological weapons were developed and stockpiled at a tremendous rate by the U.S. and the Soviet Union during 1950-70. In spite of the arms race, CBW was used only in the background in the brushfire wars of the period. North Korea alleged that the U.S. was using BW during the Korean war. Egypt was accused of using Soviet nerve agents against royalist troops in its 1963-67 intervention in Yemen. The U.S. used riot gases and defoliants during its war in Vietnam.
In 1975, reports of chemical warfare began filtering out of Laos and Afghanistan. The Hmong tribespeople of Laos claimed that they had been attacked by CBW agents released through aerial spraying. The chemical agent was dubbed "Yellow Rain," but debate still rages as to whether it actually existed. In Afghanistan, Soviet troops were accused of using lethal and incapacitating chemical agents against the Mujihaddeen. These reports remain unconfirmed as of this writing. Still, it was Yellow Rain that encouraged the U.S. to resume production of chemical weapons in the 1980s.
During the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-89, Iraq used chemical weapons against Iranian troops as early as 1982, and continued to use them throughout the war. The chemical agents used were mustard gas, tabun, and lewisite. In 1984, U.N. observers confirmed the Iraqi use of mustard gas. Later on in the war, Iraq launched lethal agents against Kurdish villages within its own borders to deal with Kurdish guerrillas supported by Iran.
The Iran-Iraq war marks the beginning of a disturbing trend of non-superpower acquisition of lethal chemical and biological agents. More and more nations are turning to CBW as proxies for the tightly regulated nuclear weapons.
There have also been cases of terrorist groups attempting to obtain commercial CBW agents or developing their own in makeshift labs. In November 1980, a raid on a Paris safehouse of the West German Red Army Faction uncovered a bathroom lab containing botulin, and in 1984, two Canadians using false credentials ordered tetanus and botulism cultures from a Maryland research firm. These incidents show the potential for terrorist use of chemical and biological warfare against their targets.
 
Author's Note: This was written before the Japanese Subway attack where terrorists used Sarin nerve gas dispersed into the Tokyo subway system to sow terror throughout Japan.
 
Future wars are likely to see greater use of chemical and biological weapons, and not only against military forces.

 

 

Page Last Modified:July 25, 2003